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U.S. Foreign Policy and the U. N.
THOMAS M. FRANCK*
I. INTRODUCTION
This fortieth anniversary of the founding of the United Nations in
San Francisco is an opportune time to reconsider the U.S. relationship
with that Organization. Objectively speaking, the U.N. should get a mixed
40-year report card: an A for its efforts on behalf of children and the
eradication of smallpox, B's for truce supervisory and related services, as
well as for the dispute mediation efforts of the Secretary-General. It de-
serves barely a C- for its work in human rights, but a B for its humanita-
rian efforts on behalf of millions of refugees from Kampuchea to the Su-
dan. It deserves an F for its failure to prevent some 200 armed conflicts
which have broken out since the Charter was written with the opening
words: "We, the peoples . . . determined to save succeeding generations
from the scourge of war."
Such a mixed report deserves no standing applause, but neither does
it call for a pie in the face. Yet, that is essentially the response the U.N.
will get on this occasion from U.S. leaders, the media and the public. At
best there will be indifference. For the most part, there will be obloquy.
My object this evening is not to praise the U.N., nor even to examine
why it has fallen so low in the esteem of the U.S. leadership and public.
Certainly, there are good reasons for scorn, and if one is so minded, the
search for warts can be most rewarding. If the U.S. Defense Department
can be characterized by detractors as the home of the $100.00 screw-
driver, the U.N. can be reified as the folks who voted to spend millions on
new buildings for the Economic Commission for Africa in Addis Ababa
while Ethiopia and much of the rest of the continent starves. To much of
the world's agony, the U.N.'s answer is: let them eat studies and reports.
But surely we are a nation that has grown tolerant of bureaucratic waste
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and incompetence. That it should exist at the U.N. does not fully explain
the current disenchantment.
Rather, I will try to show that the intensity of our current negative
feelings about the U.N. system stems, in part, from our own national pro-
clivity for unrealistic optimism. That optimism caused us to develop
wildly unrealistic expectations of what the U.N. was and what it could
and would do. And when those proved unfounded, our national spirit led
us to pursue the national pastime of institutional reform, tinkering, and
self-improvement. We were unwilling to see the U.N. as a modest, some-
times useful, sometimes dangerous place for the conduct of our multilat-
eral diplomacy. We demand that it be better and more.
II. EARLY U.S. POSITIONS ON THE ROLE OF THE U.N.
The problem begins with the campaign to ensure U.S. entry into the
new organization, in 1945. This was one of the most dramatic examples of
the "hard sell" in twentieth-century American politics. It compares with
the fanfare and high hopes that accompanied the launching of the "War
on Poverty" in the 1960's. Government officials, eminent citizens, public
interest groups, newspapers and Members of Congress of both parties
participated in an unprecedented effort on behalf of the Charter just
signed in San Francisco. This campaign, partly orchestrated by the Exec-
utive Branch, was spurred by memories of the unexpected failure of the
Senate, after World World I, to facilitate U.S. participation in the League
of Nations.
Government officials, some specially recruited for the purpose, others
summoned out of retirement, fanned out across the country to preach the
word. Former President Herbert Hoover described the San Francisco
Conference as the "most fateful conference in all American history ..."
and predicted that during its "fleeting moments the future of mankind
may be molded for the next hundred years."' Secretary of State Cordell
Hull let it be known that the U.N. held the key to "fulfillment of human-
ity's highest aspirations and the very survival of our civilization."'
Senator Tom Connally, the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee, greeted the Charter as "the greatest document of its
kind that has ever been formulated."3 His counterpart in the House of
Representatives, Congressman Sol Bloom, celebrated "this new Magna
Carta of peace and security for mankind" which would be "a turning
point in the history of civilization."" His Republican colleague on the
Committee, Representative Charles A. Eaton, called it "the most hopeful
and important document in the history of world statesmanship" and "the
greatest and most hopeful public event in history." It would carry us "to-
1. Wideroaks Plan Urged by Hoover, N.Y. Times, Mar. 25, 1945, at 29, col. 1.
2. Hull Asks Nations to Affirm the Charter, N.Y. Times, June 27, 1945, at 10, col. 1.
3. 91 CONG. REc. 7953 (1945).
4. 91 CONG. REC. 7299 (1945).
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wards a golden age of freedom, justice, peace, and social well-being
"8
Superlatives were thicker than lobbyists on Capitol Hill. Even in the
privacy of the closed sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Senator Walter George opined that the Charter was "perhaps the most
important foreign policy step that this Nation has taken in all of its whole
history"' and Senator John L. McClellan of Arkansas called it "the most
momentous document ever produced by man."'7 Senator Alben Barkley,
soon to become Vice President, thought it would "take its place alongside
the Magna Carta, the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution of
the United States, Lincoln's Gettysburg Address and his Second Inaugu-
ral Address as one of the great documents of human history." s The few
skeptics were labelled "peace criminals"9 by Senator Francis J. Myers of
Pennsylvania.
III. EFFECTS OF THE RATIFICATION CAMPAIGN ON U.S.PERCEPTIONS
In general, the effects of the campaign to ensure U.S. participation in
the U.N. created a false baseline of expectations against which the subse-
quent performance of the organization inevitably was measured and
found wanting. In particular, that campaign generated some very specific
and unrealistic perceptions.
Throughout the campaign for ratification, the Charter was presented
to the American public as a natural outgrowth of the U.S. Constitution
and the U.N. itself as the next phase in a higher federalism that emulated
and drew upon our constitutional history. Secretary of State Edward R.
Stettinius, Jr. spoke of the Security Council, the General Assembly, the
Economic and Social Council and the International Court of Justice as
"vines and trees" transplanted from our soil to "unfamiliar environ-
ments" where they would flourish, even if it had been necessary "to cut
them back and prune them" for their journey from "the world of individ-
ual and group relations to the world of international relations . . .. '
President Truman, speaking to the San Francisco Conference, said that
the U.S. Constitution "came from a Convention which - like this one -
was made up of delegates with many different views. Like this Charter,
our Constitution came from a free and sometimes bitter exchange of con-
flicting opinions. When it was adopted, no one regarded it as a perfect
document. But it grew and developed, and expanded and upon it there
5. Id. at 7299-7300.
6. The Charter of the U.N., Hearings before the Senate Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions, minutes of the Exec. Sess., (July 29, 1981) (unpublished manuscript) (available in the
National Archives, Washington, D.C.).
7. 91 CONG. RaC. 8082 (1945).
8. Id. at 7969.
9. Id. at 8105.
10. Summary of Report on Results of the San Francisco Conference, 13 DEP'T. ST.
BULL. 77 (1945).
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was built a bigger, a better, a more perfect union. This Charter, like our
own Constitution, will be expanded and improved as time goes on.""
Senator Connally promised that what we were joining was "an agency
of tremendous influence and power" which states had "invested with au-
thority, if necessary, to preserve and restore international peace... a star
in the night . . . a gleaming beacon . . . ."" Senator Warren Austin of
Vermont, soon to become the chief U.S. delegate to the U.N., thought
that the General Assembly had been given "jurisdiction over the general
welfare of the peoples of the earth.""
Inflated expectations, when they are inevitably disappointed, tend to
turn to backlash. The problem is endemic to our system of government.
To secure Congressional support for a new venture, if is too often touted
as the complete answer to a bale of disparate, complex, and perhaps, es-
sentially insoluble problems. In modern political public relations terms, it
will not do to present a program as a "mere amelioration", "better than
nothing", or "the least of evils". It must be oversold to have a chance in
Congress. The public demands elixirs; the system is geared to provide
them. Yet, the very technique of overselling, needed to ensure that the
proposal gets a chance at life, also ensures that it will ultimately be
judged a failure and, perhaps, even be repealed.
IV. THE REALITIES OF THE U.N. DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESS
A. Impossibility of Multilateral Agreement
It did not take long to learn that the crucial dispute settlement and
collective security machinery of the U.N. could not work in the absence of
Big Power unanimity, a condition which, in practice, could almost never
be met after San Francisco.
On January 19, 1946, the Shah of Iran complained to the Security
Council about the continued presence and role of Soviet troops in the
Province of Azerbaijan." It was the U.N.'s first major crisis; and demon-
strated, right from the start, the severe limitations under which the or-
ganization operates when it is drawn into a dispute between the super-
powers, each of which can block action by the Security Council - the
only organ empowered to take action in such crises.
This should have been expected by anyone reading the Charter or
following the turbulent behind-the-scenes negotiations at San Francisco,
where in such matters as its claim to multiple memberships in the organi-
zation, and its handling of Polish Representation, the Kremlin had made
it clear that it would not accept the authority of international agencies in
matters of national security or other important self-interests. However,
11. Id. at 3.
12. 91 CONG. REc. 6878 (1945).
13. Id. at 8060.
14. U.N. SCOR Supp. (No. 1) at 16, U.N. Doc. S/1 (1946).
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U.S. leaders had steadfastly denied this. Asked what would happen if a
permanent member vetoed action in the face of aggression, Secretary of
State Stettinius had answered that "we should not be too deeply con-
cerned with the kind of question Franklin Roosevelt always characterized
as 'iffy'. '" Instead, testifying before the Senate, he said, "I believe the
five major nations proved at San Francisco beyond the shadow of a doubt
that they can work successfully and in unity with each other and with the
other United Nations under this Charter." 6
B. Institutional Engineering by the United States
The campaign to transfer dispute settlement to the Assembly began
with the international crisis growing out of the Greek civil war. In Decem-
ber, 1946, Athens complained to the U.N. that its northern neighbors
were supporting Greek Leftist guerillas. The Security Council was quickly
deadlocked and Washington decided to seek collective action through the
General Assembly, where the Soviets could not veto and the U.S. would
be able to count on almost an automatic majority. Thus, ten days after
the inconclusive Security Council debate on the Commission's report, the
U.S. brought the question to the Assembly. On October 21, 1947, that
body overwhelmingly voted to set up the United Nations Special Com-
mittee on the Balkans (UNSCOB).
1 7
This had consequences that reached beyond the immediate crisis.
The Assembly, conceived as a global town meeting, was suddenly pro-
pelled into the business of peace-making and conflict management. It was
a fateful tactical choice, for we had now demonstrated how the Assembly
could be used in disputes between members, and that it could influence
their outcomes.
The Assembly, over strenuous Communist opposition, proclaimed an
embargo on aid to the Leftists in Greece and authorized UNSCOB to
"observe compliance", which it did by reporting "large scale" violations
by the governments of Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia. 8 The Assembly
then passed further resolutions calling on those members to desist.19 It
also billed all members for UNSCOB's expenses, much to the annoyance
of those who voted against it. UNSCOB continued in its observer role
until December, 1951.
If UNSCOB did not have a profound effect on the Greek civil war, it
did have an effect on the Charter. It was a precedent for the right of the
Assembly to assume the Security Council's responsibility for settling dis-
putes, conducting investigations and fact-finding, as well as monitoring
15. Report on the San Francisco Conference, 12 DFP'T. ST. BULL. 1007, 1010 (1945).
16. The Charter of the United Nations: Hearings before the Senate Comm. on Foreign
Relations, 79th Cong., 1st. Sess. 49 (1945) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings].
17. G.A. Res. 109(11), U.N. Doc. A/519, at 461-62 (1947).
18. G.A. Res. 193(11), U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
19. Id., at 1 3.
1986
DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
compliance.
This shift of power from Council to Assembly proceeded apace dur-
ing the Korean War. When North Korea invaded South Korea on June
25, 1950, the Soviet Union happened to be boycotting the Security Coun-
cil in protest against the failure to seat the representative of Peking. This
fluke made it possible for the council to authorize the first and only U.N.
collective security operation,"' after the U.S. had succeeded in getting it
not to count the Soviet absence as a veto (more "engineering"). However,
by the end of that summer the Soviets had returned to the Council, just
about the time (September) when General Douglas MacArthur's U.N.
forces began advancing rapidly across the old boundary between the
Koreas. This meant that the U.N. command needed new instructions, but
with the Soviets back, the Council was paralyzed. To overcome that prob-
lem, Dean Acheson - now Secretary of State - had the General Assem-
bly take over the Council's role. On October 7, 1950 it passed a resolution
which, in effect, authorized MacArthur to pursue the retreating North
Korean army into its own territory."
Empowering the Assembly to do this had far-reaching implications
for the distribution of functions and powers within the U.N. Secretary-
General Trygve Lie declared himself elated. "This was Korea, not Man-
churia," he wrote, "this was the United Nations, not the League of
Nations."2
With Lie's support, the U.S. next persuaded the Assembly to estab-
lish simplified procedures for convening that body to do most of the
things the Charter had assigned to the Council whenever the Council was
deadlocked by a veto. This procedure became known as "Uniting For
Peace".22 In proposing it to the Assembly, our Ambassador, Benjamin Co-
hen, actually said that the U.N. should follow the U.S. Supreme Court's
practice of construing the Constitution flexibly, allowing the system to
invent new ways of overcoming unanticipated difficulties without formal
amendment of the basic compact. To the mystified delegates he cited our
Court's decision in McCulloch v. Maryland, in which additional "implied
powers" of the federal government were inferred from those enumerated
in the Constitution.
24
The British were strongly, if privately, opposed to Uniting For Peace,
warning that a future third world majority would take advantage of it to
undercut the veto at a time when the West might need it.25 Some Ameri-
20. 5 U.N. SCOR (473rd mtg.) at 18, U.N. Doc. S/1511 (1950).
21. G.A. Res. 376(V), 5 U.N. GAOR, U. N. Doc. A/1434 (1950).
22. T. LIE, IN THE CAUSE OF PEACE 345-46 (1954).
23. G.A. Res. 377A(V), 5 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/1481 (1950).
24. B. COHEN, THE UNITED NATIONS; CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS, GROWTH, POS-
SIBILITIES 18-19 (1961).
25. The British Government, under severe pressure to support the Acheson Plan -
which they eventually felt compelled to do - told U.S. Ambassador Lewis Douglas, in
London, that "safeguards provided by [the] veto are useful since at some future date [the]
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cans, like Dean Acheson, saw no problem because they did not take the
U.N. seriously in the first place. Others foresaw the dawn of a brave new
era.
McGeorge Bundy, as editor of the Acheson papers, expressed the
view that Uniting For Peace was "certainly the most important develop-
ment in the application of the Charter since it was signed in San Fran-
cisco in 1945 . . . . [T]he basic authority of the United Nations in or-
ganizing collective action against aggression now rests with any two-thirds
of its members. This is a measure of the degree to which the United
States Government is prepared to entrust itself to the weight of the inde-
finable but important force called world opinion." 6 The editors of The
New York Times agreed. They rejoiced that the Assembly was not to be
"the principal organ of this world organization" and would "assume exec-
utive functions that previously were "supposed to be left to the Security
Council . . . ." By passing the resolution, the U.N. had reached a "turn-
ing point as an instrument for the suppression of aggression .... ,,"
The U.S. next used Uniting For Peace in 1956 during the Mid-East
War, again bypassing the Council in favor of the Assembly. It was the
Assembly which ordered a cease-fire and created the U.N. Emergency
Force to patrol it.28 In 1960, when the Congo crisis compelled the U.N. to
intervene, we once more led the way around a dead-locked Security
Council to the Assembly. Thereafter, when France and the Soviet Union
refused to pay their assessed share of the large costs of those operations,
the United States persuaded the General Assembly to obtain an advisory
opinion from the International Court of Justice which held that countries
opposed to an action in the General Assembly were nevertheless obliged
to pay their share of the cost.29 Even in 1963, there were those in the
State Department who warned that the Court's advice was not in the
long-term interest of the U.S., but we were still in our institutional engi-
neering period and the cautions went unheeded.
While creatively engineering the transfer of power from the Council
to the Assembly, the U.S. was also trying to whittle away at the veto. In
September of 1959, the Government of Laos requested the sending of a
U.N. emergency force to "halt aggression" by North Vietnam. When the
Council met to consider this request, the U.S. proposed to send a fact-
finding committee to investigate. A vote was taken, producing the then-
U.K. might need [the] veto to protect [its] own basic interests" against the potential "irre-
sponsibility" of the General Assembly. DEPT OF STATE, FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED
STATES 323, 320, 330 (1976).
26. THE PATTERN OF RESPONSmILITY 256 (M. Bundy, ed. 1952).
27. Turning Point for the U.N., N.Y. Times, Oct. 20, 1950, at 26, col. 2.
28. G.A. Res. 997(ES-1), 10 U.N. GAOR (562nd plen. mtg.), U.N. Doc. A/3256 (1956);
G.A. Res. 1000 (ES-1), 10 U.N. GAOR (565th plen. mtg.), U.N. Doc. A/3290 (1956); G.A.
Res. 1001(ES-1), 10 U.N. GOAR (567th plen. mtg.), U.N. Doc. A/3308 (1956).
29. G.A. Res. 1731(XVI), 16 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/5062 (1961); Certain Expenses of
the United Nations, 1962 I.C.J. 163 (Advisory Opinion of July 20, 1962).
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customary majority for the Western proposal, but with the Soviets op-
posed. Moscow's representative thought he had cast a veto. However, the
presiding officer (Italy's Ortona) ruled that the creating of a sub-commit-
tee was a procedural decision and thus not subject to the veto. This tac-
tic, the result of a prior agreement between the U.S. and Italian delegates,
created a potentially important loophole in the permanent members' veto
power; one to which, incidentally, Secretary-General Hammarskjold was
strongly opposed. 0 Precedent by precedent, we were creating a U.N.
which would make a great deal of trouble for us once we lost control of
it.8 1
Two more instances will illustrate the "engineering" proclivity of this
period. One concerns our campaign to win a second term for Secretary-
General Trygve Lie, whose stout support for the U.N. action in Korea
had earned him the emnity of the Soviet Union. When Moscow an-
nounced that it would veto his re-election, the U.S. first replied that it
would veto anyone else. Then, after the Security Council was dead-
locked, we used our majority in the General Assembly to pass a resolution
"extending" Lie's term of office for a further five years, 2 a maneuver cer-
tainly not sanctioned by the Charter. The second instance of our creative
engineering occurred after the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956, when,
as a symbolic show of disapproval, we persuaded the Assembly to refuse
to accept the credentials of the Assembly delegates sent by the Kadar
regime installed by the Soviets. Again, we did not seem to count the long-
term costs of setting this precedent, which is now used annually in efforts
to reject the credentials of the Israeli delegates.
V. U.S. RESPONSES TO PERCEIVED U.N. INADEQUACIES
A. U.S. Abrogation of U.N. Policies and Rules
For as long as the United States could count on the support of a
majority of members in the principal organs of the U.N., it was relatively
easy for us to play by the rules, especially as we could use that majority
to interpret the rules, or change them to suit our purposes. By the mid-
fifties, however, we could no longer count on this automatic majority; and,
gradually emulating our adversaries, we began to violate those rules
which did not suit our purpose, thereby alienating us from the organiza-
tion and undermining our moral authority.
In June, 1954, the CIA, in cooperation with neighboring Honduras
and Nicaragua, mobilized and equipped an army of exiles to overthrow
the Leftist Guatemalan government of President Arbenz Guzman. When
30. For an interesting discussion of this event, and Secretary General Dag Ham-
marskjold's disapproval of the tactic, see B. URQUHART, HAMMARSKJOLD 344-45 (1972).
31. See generally T. FRANCK, NATION AGAINST NATION: WHAT HAPPENED TO THE U.N.
DREAM AND WHAT THE U.S. CAN Do ABOUT IT (1985).
32. G.A. Res. 492(V), 5 U.N. GAOR(V) (298th plen. mtg.) at 289, U.N. Doc. A/1475
(1950). The resolution was adopted by a vote of 46 to 5, with 8 abstentions.
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Guatemala complained to the Security Council,33 Washington denied any
involvement and expressed indignation at the charge. We insisted that
the Council not take up the Guatemalan complaint, but that it seek medi-
ation in the Organization of American States. The U.S.-led majority was
easily able to prevent the U.N. from responding affirmatively to the Gua-
temalan plea for an on-site investigation of what was happening. Just
before Guatemala was finally overrun it was Ambassador Lodge, at that
time presiding over the Council, who succeeded with our allies in getting
the Council to adjourn without adopting an agenda or hearing the Guate-
malan complaint.34 This was clearly a distortion of the intent of the draft-
ers of the Charter. Shortly after San Francisco, U.S. Delegate John Foster
Dulles had stated that the U.N. would be "given the first opportunity to
maintain peace everywhere, using presumably regional organizations;
which it is invited to do, but not absolutely compelled to do."35 Secretary
of State Stettinius had told the Council in January, 1946, in connection
with Iran's complaint against the Soviets, that "the United States Gov-
ernment believes that any member country of the United Nations which
makes a complaint has a right to be heard at this table." 6 What we did to
the Charter in 1954 undoubtedly made it easier and cheaper in terms of
public opinion costs for the U.S.S.R. to invade Hungary in 1956, using the
same arguments about the primacy of regional organizations (in this case
the Warsaw Pact).
The tendency to cheat on the rules had surfaced in other instances in
which the U.S. has used covert, or even overt, force against another state
in violation of Articles 2(4) and 51 of the Charter. Of course we are
neither the only, nor the worst, cheater. Cheating has become quite re-
spectable nowadays. As many as can, do. We are not the only ones to be
disillusioned.
That sad reality requires some rethinking on our part. Should the
U.S. now try to raise the standard of compliance by upgrading its own
performance - "cleaning up our act" - or should it openly embrace the
venal ways now so prevalent, practicing them with less guilt and more
skill? In the area of human rights, for example, should we join the U.N.
majority to criticize and discomfit Chile's Pinochet regime for its failure
to live up to international human rights standards, even though the As-
sembly's majority blocks criticism of Poland's Pinochet-lookalike, General
Jaruzelski? Since the advent of the Reagan Administration, the U.S. has
focused on the "double standard" and declared itself unwilling to join the
censure of Chile as long as the transgressions of General Jaruzelski go
unnoticed. Theo VanBoven, when Director of the U.N.'s Human Rights
33. Cablegram dated 19 June, 1954 from Min. Ext. Rel. of Guat. to Pres. of Sec. Coun-
cil. U.N. Doc. S/3232 (1954) at 1. For a full account of "the American coup in Guatemala,"
see S. SCHLESINGER & S. KINZER, BITTER FRUIT (1982).
34. 9 U.N. SCOR (675-76th mtg.) at 32, 34, U.N. Doc. S/3236/Rev. 1 (1954).
35. Senate Hearings, supra note 16, at 474.
36. U.N. SCOR Supp. (No. 1) at 18, U.N. Doc S/1 (1946).
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Division, criticized this. "I find it unacceptable," he said, "that a situation
of gross violations of human rights in any country should not be dis-
cussed, or action taken thereon, simply because other situations have not
been taken up as well. '3 7 The Reagan Administration, however, now has
taken the position that if others are allowed to cheat, we will no longer
play by the rules that are not enforced. That approach, although not
without logical or tactical merit, is subject to the reply that we were
among the first to fiddle with the rules; and, when that became impossi-
ble, to cheat on them.
B. Withdrawal From the U.N. System by the U.S.
Outright repudiation of the rules, and of the whole U.N. system, is
the most recent response of our failure to get the organization we were led
to expect and which we expected to lead. This has generated a growing
withdrawal syndrome. As Senator Steven Symms of Idaho explained,
"[t]axpayers are sick and tired of playing host to our enemies and critics
abroad."3 8
The "withdrawal" mode of response is of quite recent origins and
poses the most serious tactical questions. We withdrew from the Interna-
tional Labour Organization in the era of the Carter Administration, but
then returned. We have announced our intention to withdraw from
UNESCO, and already selectively do not participate in some organs of
the General Assembly, such as the Committee of Twenty-Four (on
"colonialism"), the Special Committee on the Inalienable Rights of the
Palestinian People, and in such Assembly-convened activities as the 1983
Conference on Palestine and, perhaps most significantly, the institution
being established to administer the treaty on the Law of the Sea. We
have also tended to distance ourselves from international efforts to stabi-
lize commodity prices through production quotas or price support sys-
tems, and from aspects of the program for world population control.
The "withdrawal" mode is activated by different degrees of fear and
antagonism towards international organizations. First, there is the antag-
onism directed towards a particular organization, such as UNESCO, be-
cause of the way it operates. Second, there is antagonism towards some
institutions - the sea law authority, for one - because their activities
are ideologically incompatible with the dominant philosophy of the
United States Government. Third, and most significant, is a discernible
tendency to reject, for tactical reasons, all multilateralism.
Examples of the last-mentioned predilection abound of late. Al-
though Nicaragua has frequently used the Security Council to indict the
U.S. for interference in its internal conflicts, the U.S. has refused to recip-
37. Address at opening of 38th Sess. of Comm. on Human Rights, Geneva, 1 Feb. 1982,
reprinted in T. VON BOVEN, PEOPLE MATTER: VIEWS ON INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS POL-
iCY 83 (1982).
38. Senate Votes to Cut Contribution to U.N., N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 1983, at A7, col. 1.
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rocate with an indictment by the U.S. and El Salvador of Nicaragua's
interference in the Salvadoran civil war, on the ground that we should
take as few initiatives in the Council as possible. The same general mood
was evident when the U.S. withdrew its agreement to the jurisdiction of
the International Court of Justice, in order to avoid having to face Nica-
ragua there, and later refused to participate in the "merits" phase of the
Court proceedings.
Another indication of the new, general skepticism towards all multi-
lateral forums is the refusal of the U.S. to try to use U.N. peacekeeping
machinery - one of the few things at the U.N. that works - during the
1982 Beirut crisis. Although the PLO and, reluctantly, the Soviet Union
were prepared to have the Council authorize a U.N. force, or an enlarge-
ment of the existing UNIFIL force in southern Lebanon, to supervise the
departure of the Palestinians from Beirut, this option was not really pur-
sued. Admittedly, the Israelis expressed reservations about the impartial-
ity of a U.N. contingent, and the Christian-led Lebanese Government
preferred to accept French, Italian and U.S. contingents with British sup-
port. Nevertheless, a U.N. presence clearly could have been established
had the chief U.S. delegate pressed for it. She did not, because she be-
lieved the U.N. to be the inferior instrument.
The non-U.N. alternative, however, did not prove to be any bargain.
The U.S.-French-Italian force left too quickly, then returned after the
Shatila Camp massacre with an uncertain mission. Once it encountered
resistance from elements of the population, it was quickly shown to have
a fragile political and military foundation. Its composition virtually guar-
anteed the accelerated intrusion of the cold war. A neutral force, estab-
lished by the Security Council and underwritten by all one hundred fifty-
nine U.N. members, would probably have fared better and could scarcely
have done worse.
This may simply illustrate that a realistic skepticism towards the
U.N.'s capabilities, while perhaps a healthy antidote to earlier illusions
and unwarranted optimism, can create new dangers to the national inter-
est if indulged to excess. It is not necessarily true that the organization is
capable of doing nothing that accords with the national interest of the
United States.
VI. CONCLUSION
That the U.S. responses to the U.N. have come primarily in the form
of exaggerated reactive tendencies may evince an insufficiently clear vi-
sion of America's long term global interests and commitments. In the fu-
ture, however, the severity of our reactive "swings and roundabouts," the
intensities of our mercurial tendencies, could cause us to catapult right
out of the established international political system. That has become a
distinct, immediate possibility. It must not happen. The U.N. would not
cease to exist if we were to leave it. Rather, it would become a greater
danger to our national interests. What we need is a strategy for being
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more effective within the principal organs. We need to identify a few sali-
ent, long-term goals that are rooted deep in our national history and con-
science. Then, we should carefully plan a few skirmishes, each year,
which, if won, would advance us along the road to those goals. Finally, we
should commit to victory in those designated skirmishes all the resources
and strategies - the educating, wheeling, dealing, arm-twisting - that
befit a nation in which politics is the national art form.
